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We estimate the economic impact of South Korea’s targeted responses to the first large-
scale COVID-19 cluster in Seoul. We find that foot traffic and retail sales decreased only 
within a 300 meter radius of the cluster and recovered to its pre-outbreak level after four 
weeks. The reductions appear to be driven by temporary business closures rather than 
the risk avoidance behavior of the citizens. Our results imply that less intense, but more 
targeted COVID-19 interventions, such as pin-pointed, temporary closures of businesses, 
can be a low-cost alternative after lifting strict social distancing measures.
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The majority of governments have relied on massive non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) for 
containing the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), such as business and school 
closures, stay-at-home orders, bans on social gatherings, and restrictions on local and international 
travels (Hale et al., 2020). However, despite the clear health benefits, strict social distancing 
policies can lead to prolonged economic recessions. Several studies estimate the high economic 
costs of intense NPIs, such as shelter-in-place orders, or economy-wide lockdowns (Alexander 
and Kager, 2020; Anderson et al., 2020; Baker et al., 2020; Carvalho et al., 2020; Chen, Qian, and 
Wen, 2020; Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber, 2020; Kim, Koh, and Zhang, 2020).  
Recent simulation-based studies, investigating trade-offs between health benefits and 
economic costs by the form and intensity of NPIs, predict that the pandemic can be controlled 
without complete lockdowns (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Argente, Hsieh, and Lee, 2020; Aum, Lee, 
and Shin, 2020; Chen and Qiu, 2020; Chudik, Pesaran and Rebucci, 2020; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020). 
Alternative types of lower-intensity NPIs, such as a small-scale lockdown of an individual 
COVID-19 cluster can be an efficient approach for controlling disease spread without significant 
economic costs because they are likely to cause smaller disruptions to the economy. In fact, many 
countries have been transitioning to mild social distancing measures to minimize adverse 
economic costs after the intense lockdown. However, there is limited empirical evidence on the 
economic impact of less intense but more targeted NPIs.  
We fill this gap in the literature through a case study investigating the effects of South 
Korea’s targeted responses to the first large-scale COVID-19 cluster in Seoul. This outbreak of a 
local cluster, which originated from a large call center in Guro, one of the busiest urban areas in 
Seoul, infected 166 individuals, and could potentially have contributed to an explosion of local 
transmission (Park et al., 2020).1 We argue that this cluster outbreak provides a unique context for 
studying the effect of less intense but more targeted NPIs. First, the Korean government’s response 
to this cluster was a standard strategy in the fight against COVID-19, which can be adopted by 
other governments that has lifted or about to lift strict social distancing measures.2 The day after 
                                                   
1 Figure 1 shows the call center is located near two subway stations (Guro and Sindorim) and surrounded by 
high-rise apartment buildings. A large department store and Walmart-like hypermarket chains are also located 
within a 500–900 meter (.31–.56 mile) radius from the cluster.  
2 Appendix B provides details of the Korean government’s responses to COVID-19. 
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the first case in the cluster, the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) along 
with local governments organized a joint response team and enforced two-week closures of 
businesses operating in the building where the call center was located. Additionally, the joint 
response team implemented rapid and meticulous contact tracing, extensive testing, and 
encouraged voluntary risk avoidance behavior by the citizens via public disclosure of the detailed 
location information of the COVID-19 positive patients along with timelines. The situation was 
completely contained after 25 days (i.e., no additional cases linked to the cluster).  
For the empirical analysis, we use foot traffic and retail sales transaction data measured at 
a high-frequency granular level and apply a difference-in-differences (DID) method for comparing 
the changes in foot traffic and retail sales within the immediate proximity of the cluster and its 
surrounding areas before and after the public announcement about the cluster. We note sharp 
declines in foot traffic and retail sales within a 300 meter (0.19 mile) radius of the cluster during 
the first two weeks after the outbreak. However, there is no evidence that foot traffic and retail 
sales decreased beyond a 300 meter radius. The reductions in foot traffic and retail sales within 
the 300 meter radius started to rebound after two weeks and recovered to its pre-outbreak level 
after a month. Older individuals are at a significantly greater risk of developing severe illness if 
they are exposed to the novel coronavirus (Lian et al., 2020; Shahid et al., 2020). Thus, they may 
have had a stronger incentive to avoid the risk of infection and decreasing foot traffic and spending. 
However, our heterogeneity analysis reveals that reductions in foot traffic and sales were higher 
among younger individuals. Given that individuals immediately linked to the call center cluster 
were on average 38 years of age (Park et al., 2020), the baseline economic impact is likely to be 
driven by young workers whose workplace was temporarily closed after the outbreak in the cluster.  
The findings suggest that the economic cost of the Korean government’s targeted responses 
to the first large-scale COVID-19 cluster in Seoul is local and temporary. We argue that the results 
can provide valuable insights into a more efficient means of tackling the COVID-19 situation while 
protecting the economy. Several countries are lifting strict social distancing measures even as the 
virus is still raging to alleviate the adverse economic costs. In the U.S., Bartik et al. (2020) 
document that small business owners’ expected length of COVID-19  leads to a lower likelihood 
of operating their businesses and argue for significant economic benefits of short-term NPIs such 
as localized temporary lockdowns. Our results indicate that the actual economic costs, measured 
by foot traffic and retail sales, of such a short-term containment policy could be low.   
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This study contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on the economic costs 
of targeted NPIs to a COVID-19 cluster. The previous studies quantifying the impact of a localized 
shock on the local economy document that the public disclosure of information about a sex 
criminal’s move-in temporarily reduces sales prices of nearby homes after the move-in in the U.S. 
and South Korea (Linden and Rockoff, 2008; Pope, 2008; Kim and Lee, 2018). As more countries 
are lifting massive lockdowns and are likely to implement more targeted and temporary NPIs, it is 
of great interest to policymakers and researchers to understand the effects of the targeted NPIs on 
the local economy. Although an increasing number of studies have investigated the spending 
response of consumers to COVID-19, they have examined the economic costs through 
counterfactual simulations using augmented SIR epidemiology models (Acemoglu et al., 2020; 
Argente, Hsieh, and Lee, 2020; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020). To the best of our knowledge, this is one 
of the first studies that provide reduced-form evidence of the spatial distribution and persistence 
of the economic cost of micro-targeted NPIs. 
 The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 details the background to 
the COVID-19 situation in South Korea, and the COVID-19 cluster that originated from a large 
call center in Seoul. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and empirical strategy, respectively. Section 
5 discusses the results, and conclusions are presented in Section 6.  
2. COVID-19 Situation in South Korea and the Guro Call Center Cluster 
The first case of COVID-19 in South Korea was reported on January 20, 2020. During the early 
stages of the outbreak, the number of confirmed cases increased sharply, with the majority of new 
infections in the south-eastern region of South Korea (Daegu and Gyeongsangbuk-do province) 
due to mass gatherings of the Shincheonji Church of Jesus with more than 310,000 members 
(KCDC, 2020). South Korea has a total population of 51.8 million, and as of August 4, it has 
14,389 cases and 301 deaths attributed to COVID-19.  
The first case from the Guro call center cluster was confirmed on March 8, 2020. Figure 
A1 reports a sharp increase in the number of confirmed cases linked to this cluster for the first two 
days following the first case. The KCDC and local governments formed a joint response team and 
launched epidemiologic investigations immediately after discovering multiple cases. On March 9, 
2020, after confirming more than 20 cases, the 19-story building housing the call center was 
ordered to close for two weeks. On March 10, the Mayor of Seoul declared the Guro call center 
case as the first large-scale cluster in the city. Since this was the first large-scale cluster, the media 
4 
covered the details of the situation in depth. As a result, the general public learned about the call 
center cluster almost immediately. Following the public announcement of the cluster, the number 
of news articles and keyword searches about the call center case recorded an immediate increase 
on Google and the most popular web search engine (NAVER) in South Korea, as shown in Figure 
A2. 
The government tested 99.8% of individuals who were working or living in the building or 
visited it two weeks before March 8 (Park et al., 2020). Confirmed positive patients were isolated, 
while those testing negative were mandated to stay self-quarantined at home for 14 days. The joint 
response team also investigated, tested, and monitored household contacts of all confirmed 
positive patients for 14 days after discovering the cluster, regardless of symptoms. During March 
13–16, 2020, the government used the mobile phone signal data of people and sent a total of 16,628 
text messages to people who were found to have spent more than 5 minutes in the vicinity of the 
building. The messages instructed recipients to avoid contact with people and visit the nearest 
COVID-19 screening station for a test. The Guro call center cluster was contained completely after 
25 days as there were no more positive patients linked to this cluster. 
3. Data 
We use two data sources that include census block-level information on foot traffic and retail sales 
in Seoul.3 First, we use hourly estimates of foot traffic (i.e., individuals physically present at the 
time) based on mobile phone signals. KT, the second-largest mobile telecom carrier in South Korea 
with a market share of 26%, provides these estimates based on their proprietary cell phone signal 
data using the following procedures: 1) KT calculates the amount of foot traffic by collecting 
mobile signals for each signal tower at a specific time; 2) It adjusts this number using its market 
share, mobile usage ratio, and the on/off ratio of mobile signals in each block. 3) KT further adjusts 
the block-specific foot traffic using census block characteristics because some census blocks have 
multiple signal towers.4  
Second, we use estimates of daily retail sales based on data from card transactions. Shinhan 
Card, the largest credit card company in South Korea with a market share of 22%, provides these 
computed estimates based on their proprietary card transaction data. Shinhan Card uses transaction 
records from the payment terminal of each store and estimates the total sales of each block using 
                                                   
3 A census block is the minimal geographical unit classified by the statistical office of South Korea. The size of a 
census block is less than 0.1 km2 (about 0.04 square mile) on average. There are 19,153 blocks in Seoul.  
4 For the details, visit http://data.seoul.go.kr/dataVisual/seoul/seoulLivingPopulation.do.  
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additional information such as the market share of the card company and the card usage patterns 
based on sector, region, time, and demographic subgroups. 
For the empirical analysis, we construct the block and week-level panel data covering 123 
blocks in the vicinity of the COVID-19 cluster, and 11 weeks between February 3 and April 19, 
2020.5 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of foot traffic and retail sales. Column (1) indicates 
that the average hourly foot traffic per block is approximately 500, implying that on average, 500 
individuals are present per block within a 900 meter radius in a given hour.6 The average hourly 
foot traffic within a 100 meter radius of the cluster is about 760 individuals, higher than other 
blocks at longer distances from the cluster. This is because the call center building is located in a 
highly concentrated business area. The average hourly foot traffic level within a 100–500 meter 
radius is about 330–360 individuals, which is less than the 500–900 meter radius, having 
approximately 590 individuals, because hypermarkets and a large-scale department store are 
located within a 500–900 meter radius of the cluster. Column (2) reveals that the average daily 
sales amount per block is about 21 million Korean won (US$17,456).7 Contrary to the fact that the 
average foot traffic is largest within a 100 meter radius, the average sales amount within a 100 
meter radius is the smallest. The majority of retail sales took place in blocks at a distance of 500–
900 meters from the cluster due to the presence of hypermarkets and a large department store.  
4. Empirical Strategy 
To identify the spatial distribution of the economic cost of the first COVID-19 cluster in Seoul and 
its persistency, we compare changes in foot traffic and retail sales in the immediate and 
surrounding areas before and after the public announcement of the cluster. Figure A3 shows trends 
of logarithm values for foot traffic and retail sales during weekdays in panels A and B, respectively. 
The trends indicate that, following the announcement of the cluster, the foot traffic and retail sales 
reduced sharply within a 300 meter radius. The declines within a 100 meter radius were greater 
than the 100–300 meter radius. However, it began to rebound two weeks after the cluster outbreak. 
Furthermore, little changes were observed in foot traffic and sales within a 300–900 meter radius 
of the cluster. We employ the following DID regression model to estimate the changes in foot 
traffic and retail sales: 
                                                   
5 The results, available upon request, are similar but noisier when using block- and day-level panel data.  
6 The average hourly foot traffic increases to 1,219 if we restrict the sample to the data collected during working 
hours (i.e., between 9am and 6pm). 
7 1 US$ is equivalent to 1,203 Korean Won as of July 20, 2020.  
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y",$,% = β( +**β$,% ∙ Dist$ ∙ Week%
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+ λ" + µ% + ϵ",$,% 
where y",$,% indicates logarithm values of foot traffic and sales at block 𝑖, in distance 𝑑, and week 
𝑡.8 Dist$ (𝑑=1,⋯,5) is a dummy variable indicating whether block 𝑖 is located within a certain 
radius from the call center, where 𝑑 is assigned as 1 to 5 for blocks if linear distance from the call 
center to the blocks is within 100m, 100–300m, 300–500m, 500–700m, and 700–900m, 
respectively. Based on the raw data patterns shown in Figure A3, we use blocks in the farthest 
distance (𝑑=5) as the control group, where the linear distance from the call center is 700–900 
meters. As the reference week, we use the week from March 2–8 (𝑡=0), a week before the cluster 
case. λ" represents block fixed effects, controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity in foot traffic 
and sales within each block. µ% are week-fixed effects, controlling for common time trends of 
dependent variables across all blocks. We do not include other control variables because we 
consider block fixed effects in the regression equation. Since we investigate short-term changes in 
the dependent variables over the two months, it is not feasible to include time-varying 
characteristics at the block level.  
The parameter of interests are β$,%s where 𝑑=1,⋯, 4 and 𝑡=-4,⋯, -1, 1,⋯, 6. The estimated 
parameter values represent differences in log(foot traffic) and log(sales) in blocks in distance 𝑑 
relative to those in the control group distance (𝑑=5) in week 𝑡, compared to the difference between 
the two distance groups in the reference week. For statistical inference, we calculated standard 
errors clustered at the block level to account for the serial correlations in foot traffic and retail 
sales.  
5. Results 
5.1. Effects on Foot Traffic  
Figure 2 reports DID estimates of the impact of the first large-scale COVID-19 cluster on foot 
traffic in Seoul.9 Panels A and B separately present the findings based on weekdays and weekends 
to distinguish the role of the business closure order in the cluster building and risk avoidance 
behavior by the citizens. Foot traffic during weekends is more likely to reflect voluntary decisions 
because most employees would not need to commute to their workplaces.  
                                                   
8 We assign the following values to the week variable: -4 to February 3–9, -3 to February 10–16, -2 to February 
17–23, -1 to February 24–March 1, 0 to March 2–8, 1 to March 9–15, 2 to March 16–22, 3 to March 23–29, 4 to 
March 30–April 5, 5 to April 6–12, and 6 to April 13–19. 
9 Table A1 reports the corresponding regression results for log(foot traffic) and log(sales) during weekdays. 
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Panel A reveals limited heterogeneity in trends based on the distance from the cluster 
before the outbreak, thus providing evidence of a pre-parallel trend assumption that the change in 
foot traffic over time is similar across distance groups. Further, we observe a sharp decline of 14% 
and 18% in foot traffic within a 100-meter (.06 mile) radius of the cluster during the first and the 
second week after the outbreak, respectively, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
foot traffic response within a 100–300 meter radius from the cluster records a similar pattern with 
smaller magnitudes, while the estimates during the first two weeks are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. However, there is no evidence of a decrease in foot traffic beyond a 300 meter 
radius after the outbreak of the call center cluster. The estimates are smaller in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant. The reduced foot traffic within a 300 meter radius starts rebounding after 
two weeks, consistent with the fact that businesses in the call center building are permitted to 
operate after two weeks. There is also a possibility of people becoming less cautious about visiting 
places near the call center cluster after two weeks because the vast majority of the cases linked to 
the call center cluster were confirmed within a couple of days after the public disclosure of the 
cluster, and only a few more cases were confirmed after the first week. The reduced foot traffic 
fully recovers to its pre-outbreak level after four weeks of the outbreak. Our back-of-the-envelope 
calculation suggests that, over four weeks after the call center cluster outbreak, the number of 
individuals visiting the area during weekdays reduced by 47.6% and 17.7% within a 100-meter 
and 100–300 meter radius, respectively, compared to the average foot traffic during the week just 
before it. The reduced foot traffic attributed to the outbreak of the Guro call center cluster over the 
four weeks within a 300 meter radius is equivalent to about 0.6% of the average hourly foot traffic 
of the entire Guro district during the week right before the cluster outbreak.  
Panel B demonstrates the impact on the foot traffic during weekends, indicating little 
evidence of a decline in foot traffic in the vicinity of the call center building after the cluster 
outbreak. This result suggests that the risk avoidance behavior of the citizens did not play a 
significant role in reducing foot traffic in response to the cluster outbreak. It is also noteworthy 
that there is a strong pre-trend within a 100 meter radius well before the cluster outbreak. This 
decrease is possibly attributed to the risk avoidance behavior of individuals because the number of 
aggregate confirmed cases in South Korea recorded a sharp increase from February 18, 2020, two 
weeks before the call center cluster outbreak. There are large event venues exclusively used for 
weddings and a full-fledged hotel also containing large wedding halls in a 100 meter radius of the 
call center building. Since wedding ceremonies usually take place on weekends and involve a large 
number of guests from various locations, people might have avoided visiting places near the call 
center building even before the cluster was created.  
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We conduct the heterogeneity analysis by age to further examine potential mechanisms 
which would cause a decrease in foot traffic in the cluster during weekdays. Since the coronavirus 
presents a more severe health risk to older individuals, existing studies have shown that older 
people have a stronger incentive to avoid the risk of infection (Argente, Hsieh, and Lee, 2020; 
Brotherhood et al., 2020). However, the individuals linked to this building were ordered to self-
quarantine, and their average age was 38 years (Park et al., 2020). We hypothesize that, if the risk 
avoidance behavior (the business closure order) is the leading factor, then the impact on foot traffic 
would be greater among older individuals. Panel A of Figure A4 shows a greater foot traffic impact 
among younger individuals in their 20s and 30s compared to older individuals. This suggests that 
the influence on foot traffic during the weekdays is likely due to the business closures. To further 
investigate the hypothesis that the reduction in foot traffic is due to business closure, we also 
exploited the fact that 72% of individuals connected to the call center building were females. Panel 
B of Figure A4 indicates that the decline in foot traffic is greater among females, which is 
consistent with our interpretation.  
5.2. Effects on Sales 
Figure 3 presents DID estimates for the total retail sales. The overall trends of sales during 
weekdays are similar to foot traffic, as shown in Panel A. The total sales decreased by about 140% 
within a 100 meter radius at its peak, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Further, 
it starts rebounding after two weeks, reaching the pre-outbreak level after four weeks. The sales 
response within a 100–300 meter radius exhibits a similar pattern, but with smaller magnitudes. 
The estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level at its peak. Our back-of-the-envelope 
calculation indicates that during the four weeks after the outbreak of the cluster, sales within a 100 
meter and 100–300 meter radius of the cluster reduced by 354% and 258% in total, respectively, 
compared to the average sales during the week right before the cluster outbreak. The reduction in 
sales due to the outbreak of the Guro call center cluster over the four weeks within a 300 meter 
radius is equivalent to 1.85% of average daily sales of the entire Guro district during the week just 
before the cluster outbreak.  
 Panel B shows limited evidence of systematic changes in sales during weekends. In 
combination with the findings of Panel B in Figure 2, this result implies that the cluster did not 
lead to significant economic costs during weekends because citizens did not display a definite risk 
avoidance behavior. However, we acknowledge that the pattern of sales within a 100 meter radius 
of the cluster is noisy, but appears to decrease following the outbreak of the cluster. We suspect 
9 
that the noisy pattern is mostly attributed to the change in sales linked to wedding ceremonies. 
Since a wedding ceremony in South Korea typically involves huge expenditure, a massive wedding 
ceremony can affect the sales patterns within the limited geographical boundary (i.e., only one 
block within a 100 meter radius) significantly.  
The heterogenous sales impact by sector is further investigated in Figure 4 to examine 
whether sectors with more discretionary consumer spending face a larger reduction in sales. 
Considering that the baseline impact on sales is observed only within a 300 meter radius of the 
cluster, we modify our baseline DID model to estimate changes in retail sales between blocks 
within a 300 meter and 300–900 meter radius of the cluster before and after the outbreak in each 
sector. Each bar represents the DID estimates on the total sales during weekdays within a 300 
meter radius during the first two weeks after the outbreak, compared to a 300–900 meter radius. 
This indicates that the sale reduction is driven by relatively discretionary spending items. For 
example, a larger decline in sales are observed in the apparel and accessories sector (-279%) and 
the sports/entertainment sector (-202%) compared with the restaurant or healthcare sectors.10 
We further conduct the heterogeneity analysis by age and gender to examine potential 
mechanisms. Figure A5 shows that the estimated impact on sales is generally greater among 
younger individuals and females, which is consistent with the findings from Figure A4. The results 
imply that the reductions in sales are primarily driven by the closures of businesses located in the 
cluster building rather than risk avoidance behavior.11 
6. Conclusion 
We estimate the economic impact of the Korean government’s targeted responses to the first large-
scale COVID-19 cluster in Seoul. We demonstrate that the economic costs are highly local and 
temporary. The decline in foot traffic and retail sales were only observed within a 300-meter (0.19 
mile) radius from the cluster and recorded a full recovery after four weeks. Our heterogeneity 
analysis indicates that the reductions in foot traffic and retail sales are primarily caused by 
temporary business closures rather than the risk avoidance behavior of the citizens. 
                                                   
10 Figure A6 shows the results of the same analysis using weekend data. Apparel and accessories (-150%), 
sports/entertainment (-77%), event/home service (-165%), and car sales/car service (-125%) show a significant 
decrease.  
11 Hypermarkets and a large-scale department store are located within a 500–900 meter radius from the cluster. 
Risk-averse individuals may shun these places to avoid crowds after the call center cluster outbreak. We use a 
modified DID model to estimate the effects of the cluster on sales in these places compared to change in sales in 
other blocks within the same distance group. There is limited evidence of the outbreak at the call center cluster 
causing a reduction in sales at hypermarkets and the department store, suggesting that citizens’ risk avoidance 
behavior may not manifest in significant economic costs. 
10 
Our findings imply that the economic costs of tailored responses can be localized and short-
term. Since several countries are lifting strict social distance measures while the virus is still 
actively spreading, our findings provide valuable insight for other countries regarding better 
management of the COVID-19 situation while protecting the economy.  
We acknowledge the limitations of this study. First, the external validity of the findings of 
this study should be taken cautiously as this is a case study estimating the localized economic costs 
of a single event. For example, Seoul is one of the most successful metropolitan cities containing 
COVID-19 and reported a very low caseload per capita (160 cases per million). Thus, the targeted 
approach may not work if local transmission being widespread and uncontrollable. Second, 
workers from the building housing the call center remained in their homes throughout the two-
week business closure, which may have boosted retail sales in their neighborhoods (e.g., food 
delivery). This possibility implies that our estimates for economic costs may be overestimated. 
Unfortunately, the data constraint limits tracking individuals’ consumption spending. However, 
we argue that this potential bias would not pose a significant problem with our key implication 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Map of the Guro Call Center Cluster 
 
 











Notes: The dependent variables is the average hourly total foot traffic per week in logarithm. For panels A and B, we 
use foot traffic data during weekdays and weekends, separately. Lines with symbols indicate DID estimates for each 
distance group. We calculate standard errors clustered at the block-level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Light 
gray dash lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Notes: The dependent variable is the average daily sales amount in logarithm. In panels A and B, we use sales data 
during weekdays and weekends, separately. Lines with symbols indicate DID estimates for each distance group. We 
calculate standard errors clustered at the block-level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Light gray dash lines 




Figure 4. Sales Response to the Guro Call Center Cluster by Sector 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the average daily sales amount during weekdays in logarithm. We 
compare changes in outcomes of interests between blocks within a 300 meter radius and 300–900 
meter radius of the cluster. Each bar represents the DID estimates in the first two weeks after the 
outbreak. We calculate standard errors clustered at the block-level and corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. Caps indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 Average Hourly Foot Traffic per Block 
Mean (SD) 
Average Daily Sales per Block  
Mean (SD) 
Total 505 (633) 20.84 (51.07) 
By Radius:   
0-100m 757 (21) 3.76 (2.50) 
100-300m 330 (361) 15.14 (24.99) 
300-500m 364 (190) 7.14 (9.37) 
500-700m 596 (745) 28.69 (58.32) 
700-900m 586 (774) 23.76 (59.76) 
Notes: The statistics are calculated using the data from weekdays during February 2020, the month before 





A. Appendix Figures and Tables 
 
Figure A1. Trend of Confirmed Cases of the Guro Call Center Case 
 
Source: Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), Press Release, March 1 – April 10, 2020; Seoul 







Figure A2. Number of News Articles and Keyword Searches 
 Containing “Guro Call Center”  
 
Number of News Articles Number of Keyword Searches 
  
Notes: Keyword Search Index represents the degree of search interest of the keyword “Guro Call Center” on web 
search engines in South Korea from March 1, 2020 to April 9, 2020. A value of 100 indicates the peak popularity for 
the term, a value of 50 means that the term is half as popular, and a score of 0 indicates insufficient search data for 
this term.  




Figure A3. Trends of Foot Traffic and Sales by Distance to the Guro Call Center 
 





Note: The dependent variables are the average hourly total foot traffic and the average daily sales amount during 




Figure A4. Foot Traffic Response to the Guro Call Center Cluster by Age and Gender 
 









B. By Gender 
Male Female 
  
Notes: The dependent variable is the average hourly total foot traffic during weekdays in logarithm. In panels A and 
B, we use foot traffic data for each age and gender group during weekdays. Lines with symbols indicate DID 
estimates for each distance group. We calculate standard errors clustered at the block-level and corrected for 





Figure A5. Sales Response to the Guro Call Center Cluster by Age and Gender 
 









B. By Gender 
Male Female 
   
Notes: The dependent variable is the average daily sales amount during weekdays in logarithm. Lines with symbols 
indicate DID estimates for each distance group. We calculate standard errors clustered at the block-level and corrected 





Figure A6. Weekend Sales Response to the Guro Call Center Cluster by Sector 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the average daily sales amount during weekends in logarithm. We compare changes 
in outcomes of interests between blocks within a 300-meter and a 300–900 meter radius of the cluster. Each bar 
represents the DID estimates in the first two weeks following the outbreak. We calculate standard errors clustered at 








Table A1. The Impact of Targeted COVID-19 Policy on Foot Traffic and Retail Sales 
 
  Log(Foot Traffic) Log(Sales) 
 (1) (2) 
Radius 0–100m   
× Week -4 -0.007 (0.012) 0.053 (0.121) 
× Week -3 0.022** (0.010) 0.059 (0.077) 
× Week -2 0.016 (0.011) 0.447*** (0.145) 
× Week -1 -0.006 (0.005) 0.295** (0.140) 
× Week 1 -0.139*** (0.006) -1.272*** (0.105) 
× Week 2 -0.179*** (0.004) -1.427*** (0.095) 
× Week 3 -0.103*** (0.005) -0.505*** (0.097) 
× Week 4 -0.055*** (0.009) -0.334*** (0.066) 
× Week 5 -0.020 (0.014) -0.090 (0.082) 
× Week 6 -0.041*** (0.015) -0.302*** (0.074) 
Radius 100–300m   
× Week -4 0.012 (0.021) -0.232 (0.217) 
× Week -3 0.042** (0.021) -0.092 (0.261) 
× Week -2 0.029 (0.021) 0.113 (0.305) 
× Week -1 0.005 (0.009) -0.266 (0.368) 
× Week 1 -0.058*** (0.011) -0.986*** (0.373) 
× Week 2 -0.065*** (0.016) -0.564 (0.396) 
× Week 3 -0.029* (0.015) -0.663* (0.351) 
× Week 4 -0.025 (0.020) -0.364 (0.336) 
× Week 5 -0.021 (0.022) -0.188 (0.152) 
× Week 6 -0.022 (0.028) -0.399 (0.336) 
Radius 300–500m   
× Week -4 -0.016 (0.013) -0.006 (0.233) 
× Week -3 0.008 (0.013) 0.365* (0.203) 
× Week -2 0.001 (0.014) 0.224 (0.176) 
× Week -1 0.004 (0.007) 0.344* (0.197) 
× Week 1 0.003 (0.007) 0.116 (0.254) 
× Week 2 0.014* (0.007) 0.138 (0.160) 
× Week 3 0.004 (0.008) 0.076 (0.139) 
× Week 4 0.005 (0.015) 0.101 (0.232) 
× Week 5 -0.015 (0.021) 0.003 (0.129) 
× Week 6 -0.028 (0.023) 0.025 (0.146) 
Radius 500–700m   
× Week -4 0.003 (0.016) -0.048 (0.163) 
× Week -3 0.010 (0.014) -0.094 (0.141) 
× Week -2 0.003 (0.016) 0.026 (0.202) 
× Week -1 0.011* (0.006) 0.033 (0.209) 
× Week 1 0.001 (0.009) -0.168 (0.159) 
× Week 2 -0.001 (0.010) -0.199 (0.192) 
× Week 3 0.000 (0.012) -0.134 (0.163) 
× Week 4 -0.009 (0.018) -0.098 (0.106) 
× Week 5 -0.028 (0.021) -0.073 (0.170) 
× Week 6 -0.034 (0.023) -0.040 (0.128) 
Observations 1353 802 
R-squared 0.998 0.954 
Notes: The dependent variables are the average hourly total foot traffic per week and the average daily sales amount 
in logarithm during weekdays, respectively. Block fixed effect is controlled for in both specifications. We calculate 
standard errors clustered at the block-level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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B. Korean Government’s Responses to COVID-19  
The Korean government has responded to the COVID-19 situation by meticulous contact tracing 
and extensive testing. Basic information such as location history of confirmed cases is obtained 
via an interview by the local health authority where the case has been confirmed. In a scenario 
where this information is considered insufficient, additional data (mobile phone location, CCTV 
footages, card transaction records, etc.) are collected and cross-checked with the information 
acquired from the initial interview. 
Information about the places visited by a COVID-19 positive patient during the entire 
period from two days before showing symptoms through the beginning of the quarantine period is 
publicly disclosed on the official websites of administrative districts visited by the patient so that 
people can avoid high-risk areas. Furthermore, for each new confirmed case, a text message is sent 
to district residents notifying them about the availability of contact tracing information of each 
new confirmed case on the official district website. In the case of the formation of a new cluster 
instead of a few isolated cases, a joint response team consisting of epidemiological inspectors and 
other government employees from the KCDC and local governments are quickly mobilized. They 
conduct thorough epidemiological investigations, and the findings are broadcasted through official 
daily briefings. The local governments enforced an executive order to temporarily shut down 
businesses to prevent additional infections only in highly limited circumstances.  
Furthermore, the government significantly expanded access to diagnostic tests for 
detecting COVID-19 cases via walk-through and drive-through screening stations. Since the 
outbreak of COVID-19, the daily testing capacity has increased almost seven-fold in two months, 
from 3,000 (58 per million) in February 2020 to approximately 20,000 (386 per million) in April 
2020. To contain the COVID-19 situation in the quickest possible manner, the Korean government 
has covered the complete costs of medical treatments for each confirmed patient, as well as the 
total expenses of diagnostic tests for suspected cases. A suspected case is defined as a person 
experiencing fever (37.5℃ or higher) or respiratory symptoms (coughs, shortness of breath, etc.) 
within 14 days of contact with a COVID-19 patient during the symptom-exhibiting period of the 
patient. 
 
